Abstract
Responsive Regulation: Achieving the Right Balance Between Persuasion and Penalisation
The challenges faced by regulators inter alia include the difficulties in addressing the problem of uncertainty generated by non prescriptive rules. Such uncertainty regarding the required level of minimum compliance could result in some companies going beyond what is actually required in complying with such rules.
1 A consequence of the uncertainties regarding what is required by the law and the strong incentive to ensure compliance, which includes increased penalties, is evidenced by the difficulty in distinguishing between "beyond compliance" and "over compliance". 2 According to Gunningham and Johnstone, the encouragement given to organizations to go beyond strict legal requirements, constitutes an important benefit of more flexible and less prescriptive models of regulation. 3 Gunningham also asserts that the unsatisfactory performance of both direct government regulation and market deregulation has compelled a review of present regulatory strategies, hence resulting in an experimentation with alternative mechanisms such as economic instruments, self-regulation, co regulation and a range of information based strategies. 4 In his opinion, the design of a "third phase" of regulation, one which still involves government intervention, but selectively and in addition to a range of market and non market solutions, will be required in order to address the inefficiencies of traditional regulation, on hand, and the flaws inherent in deregulation on the other hand. 
Interactions between states and markets Legal regulation
The occurrence of interactions between states and markets does not take place in a vacuum. 6 Such interactions determine the position assumed by legal regulation. 7 The characterisation of different types of law has occurred on the basis of reference to the their "location in space". 8 Legal pluralism, which is generally perceived to be a prominent form in globalisation, refers to "geographical or metaphorical notions of space in its conception of law." 9 A consideration of legal regulation as state-market interactions simply does not generate analytical questions which relate to the nature of these interactions, but also prescriptive questions, namely, the degree of state intervention and market ordering required for the facilitation of effective regulation.
Changes in state-market relationships are reflected through: Gradually blurred lines between states and markets, which is attributed to the privatization of states and the dominance of markets by powerful corporate actors. 11 Further, in response to changing state-market relationships, modern forms of legal regulation have developed.
12
The privilege of the inclusion of state-economy interactions in considering legal regulation derives from the definition of legal regulation, which can be defined as the regulation of economic activities.
13
"Decentring regulation" is used to express the notion that governments should not and do not have a monopoly on regulation and that regulation is now being carried out by other actors namely: large organisations, collective associations, professions, technical committees etc without government's involvement or even formal approval.
14 Decentring also refers to changes occurring within government and administration : the internal fragmentation of the tasks of policy formation and implementation.
15 Self-regulation fits into this analysis because it is a form of 'decentred' regulation as it is not state regulation.
16

Enforced Self Regulation
The responsive approach (to regulation) proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite involves a process whereby regulators proceed with compliance based strategies and then resort to more punitive "deterrents" where the desired level of compliance is not achieved. 17 In their opinion, this is a more preferable option to the positions supported either by those who believe that "gentle persuasion works in securing business compliance with the law" 18 and those who only consider that corporations would only comply with the law where tough sanctions were applied. Greater regulatory challenges, in their view, were to be found, not at the apex of the pyramid of regulatory strategies, nor at the base of the pyramid, but at the intermediate levels of the pyramid of regulatory strategies.
19 Such intermediate sections, thus, were in greatest need of regulatory innovation. With the responsive approach, it is assumed that regulation would always commence at the base of the pyramid. The Enforced Self-Regulation Model is a form of responsive regulation whereby negotiation occurs between the state and the individual firms to establish regulations that are particularized to each firm. 20 In the Enforced Self-regulation Model, each firm is required to propose its own regulatory standards in order to avoid harder (and less tailored) standards imposed by the state. 21 This individual firm is "enforced" in two senses : First the firm is required by the State to do the self-regulation. Second, the privately written rules can be publicly enforced. Governments are advised to resort to "command regulation with non-discretionary punishment" only after having considered, firstly, the provision of solutions which are self regulatory to industries, and where the relevant goals were not achieved under this option, the subsequent adoption of a more rigorous approach of "command regulation with discretionary punishment" through enforced self regulation. 23 As a result of the susceptibility of states to capture and corrupt related activities in business, it is of immense importance for third parties, non government organisations particularly, to be directly involved in the oversight of regulatory enforcement. 24 As well as this function of acting as a safeguard against the capture of state regulators, non government organisations can also directly regulate businesses themselves through schemes which they oversee.
25
Responsive regulation considers the role of non government organisations as regulators to be so fundamentally important, in the same way that businesses play a vital role as regulatorsas well as regulatees.
26
Although the 'pyramid of regulatory strategies' is directed at individual regulated firms, a parallel approach is applied by Ayres and Braithwaite to entire industries.
27
Enforced self regulation was not only proposed as a means of striking a balance between the advocates of "gentle persuasion" works best and those who favour tougher measures, but also considered to be of greatest need at the intermediate levels of the pyramid of regulatory strategies 28 . In striking this balance between compliance and enforcement measures, Ayres and Braithwaite contribute to resolving regulatory difficulties faced by regulators, of when best to apply either compliance or punitive measures, and in situations where the use of excessive punitive deterrent measures could conceal harsh treatment of less significant regulatees. According to Baldwin and Black, Ayres and Braithwaite acknowledge the possible difficulties of moving down the regulatory pyramid since relationships between regulators and regulatees, which are foundations for less punitive strategies, could be influenced through the application of overly punitive sanctions. 29 Furthermore, 'voluntary' compliance at the base of the pyramid could be rendered extremely difficult as a result of constant threat of punitive measures at the top. 30 Further criticisms directed at the pyramid approach, in addition to the above mentioned criticism, can be classified into three groups, namely, "the policy" or "conceptual", "the practical" and "the constitutional". 31 Legal problems which exist in applying a responsive approach may arise from the fact some legislatures may have stipulated deterrence procedures 22 which may leave little scope for the enforcement agency in adopting such an approach.
32
Furthermore, responsive regulation would be difficult to implement in corrupt societies since it encourages situations whereby discretion is given to bureaucrats who may exploit such discretion for purposes aimed at promoting their own interests.
33
The incentive structures which exist within a firm become very crucial in issues involving voluntary or involuntary compliance. Whilst it has been observed by some 34 that good regulatory practice should focus on outcomes of regulatory objectives, rather than compliance with prescriptive rules, the concern relating to whether compliance is 'voluntary' or 'involuntary appears to be of irrelevance as long as compliance is ultimately achieved. Nevertheless, compliance is vital , hence the need for direct monitoring by the State or government. Three fundamental elements exist in implementing responsive regulation. 35 The first of these consists of disapproval which is systematic, fairly directed and explained in its entirety. The second element combines such disapproval with a respect for regulatees , whilst the third consists of increased intensification of regulatory response in situations where the regulator has tried considerably, but without success, to meet those standards which are required.
Traditional Regulation
Advantages of Traditional Regulation
Although command and control regulation has been criticized for its rigidity, such rigidity having contributed to economic inefficiency, Latin suggests that this approach has advantages. 36 Furthermore, these advantages extend beyond those advantages identified with more tailored and flexible instruments.
37
-……"decreased information collection and evaluation costs, greater consistency and predictability of results, greater accessibility of decisions to public scrutiny and participation, increased likelihood that regulations will withstand judicial review, reduced opportunities for manipulative behavior by agencies in response to political or bureaucratic pressures, reduced opportunities for obstructive behavior by regulated parties, and decreased likelihood of social dislocation and "forum shopping" resulting from competitive disadvantages between geographical regions or between firms in regulated industries".-
38
The ability to define the expected behavior of regulatees with immense clarity, constitutes the major strength of command and control regulation. 39 
Addressing the Deficiencies of Traditional Regulation
"Responsive regulation is distinguished (from other strategies of market governance) both in what triggers a regulatory response and what the regulatory response will be". 41 Ayres and Braithwaite also propose that regulation be responsive to industry structure -since different structures will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation. 42 According to Baldwin and Black 43 , in order to be "really responsive", regulators are required to be responsive -not only to the level of compliance of the regulatee, but also to the frameworks within the firms -both operating and cognitive, to the environment which encompasses the regulatory regime, which is broader and institutional, to the different ways whereby regulatory tools and strategies operate, to the performance of the regime and ultimately, to changes which exist within each of the mentioned elements. Regulation, it is argued, is responsive when it knows its regulatees and its environments, when it is capable of coherently organizing different and new regulatory modes of reasoning, when it is sensitive to performance and when it recognizes what its changing challenges are. 44 Baldwin and Black's opinion of what is really responsive would have to take into consideration the growing impact of risk. 45 Gunningham advances the argument that the deployment of a range of regulatory actors to implement combinations of "policy instruments", which are tailored to individual goals and circumstances, will generate more effective and efficient policy outcomes and that this approach should reduce the regulatory burden on government, thereby liberating scarce resources for apportionment to those areas which are in greatest need of government intervention. 46 Greater focus is also placed on the ability of second and third parties -be it business, commercial or non commercial third parties-to act as quasi regulators who would complement or act as substitutes for government regulation in particular situations. 47 Proposals are advanced whereby a set of principles and policy prescriptions can be designed to achieve a "regulatory mix". The exercise of control, by a group of firms or individuals, over its membership and their behaviour can be considered as self-regulation. 49 Variables of self regulation consist of the governmental nature of self-regulation, the level of involvement of self regulators and the extent of the binding legal force which is connected to self-regulatory rules. 50 Claims in favour of self regulation or the incorporation of components of self regulation into governmental regulation are based on arguments related to expertise and efficiency.
51
"Coregulation, as distinct from enforced self-regulation, is usually taken to mean industryassociation self-regulation with some oversight and/or ratification by government." 52 It is distinguished from enforced self regulation in that with enforced self regulation, negotiations which are aimed at establishing regulations that are tailor made to each firm, take place between the state and individual firms.
53
Meta Regulation Why Meta Regulation Could Be the Most Responsive Form of Regulation
Regulation may be regarded as a response to risk 54 and the control of risks can be considered to be the main concern of regulation.
55 "The regulatory state is becoming a risk management state" 56 . Ulrich Beck argues that whilst the standard way of risk regulation in modern societies was well suited for such societies, it is not responsive enough to our "post modern" societies. 57 Risk is, as a result, inefficiently controlled at too high a cost. 58 Recent years have 49 See R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University Press at page 125 50 ibid at pages 125 and 126 51 ibid at page 126; In relation to expertise, it is usually advanced that self-regulatory bodies possess greater expertise than is the case with independent regulation. Efficiency is also a ground put forward by proponents of self regulation in that self regulation emphasizes the ability of self regulation to generate controls in an efficient manner -since there is greater accessibility to those being controlled. Furthermore, self regulators are able to acquire information at lower costs, incur low monitoring and enforcement costs and can easily adapt their regimes to changing industrial conditions; ibid at page 127. 52 witnessed growing acceptance of the fact that the efficiency of regulation will be enhanced where a collaboration with private control systems exists. 59 By utilising activities which relate to private internal control systems for purposes which are of public regulatory nature, regulators are not only able to relieve themselves of the cumbersome work which derives from rule making, but are also able to concentrate on the oversight of the functioning and design of local systems. 60 'Enforced self regulation', 'regulated self-regulation' and 'meta regulation' are various forms which a responsive model may assume and such a model assigns a central role to internal control systems. 61 Basel II bank regulation reforms constitute an example of meta regulation.
Meta regulation is referred to as the regulation of self regulation 62 whilst meta risk management implies the risk management of risk management. Traditionally risk management, to a large extent, has focused on complying with current rules. 63 It has great potential especially in situations where risks are volatile and where the regulator is not in a position to comprehend such risks. 64 However maximum realisation of such potential can only occur only where such risks are within the control of an enterprise where the regulator holds an influential position. 65 As was mentioned in the above paragraph, over the years, there has been a trend towards greater regulation of business management processes and strategies of regulated firms through regulatory tools which address the role of senior managements of firms and directly regulate individuals within firms. 66 According to Fiona Haynes 67 , meta regulation "with its collaborative approach to rule generation", could controversially be considered to be the approach with greatest evolvement when considered in relation to other approaches such as co-regulation, enforced self regulation and process or management-based regulation. Meta regulation is a method which is capable of managing "self regulatory capacity" within those sites being regulated whilst exercising governmental discretion in stipulating the goals and levels of risk reduction to be achieved in regulation. 68 Processes and procedures for risk management are developed, not only by key stake holders, but also by personnel within these organisations. 69 This takes place whilst ensuring that "pro-compliance motivational postures" are generated within the site being regulated such that the goal of the regulator, that is, risk reduction, is achieved. 70 The success of the implementation of meta regulation is based on the regulator and regulated organisation's understanding of risk priorities in the same manner.
71
Meta regulation is advantageous particularly where there are complex causes of harm, which also require constant monitoring.
72
However, problems related to enforcement exist. Legal and General Assurance Society v FSA highlighted how the more holistic focus which meta regulation has on systemic failures on the part of firms, rather than their specific acts or omissions, is starting to influence the ways of approaching issues of causation in the framework of regulatory responsibility.
The increasing popularity of internal control systems has been an express feature of risk management. 73 Primary or real risks 74 are translated by internal control systems into systems risks such as early warning mechanisms and compliance violation alerts. 75 As a result, many risks are capable of being and are being "operationalised" as organisational processes of control.
76 Such transformation is a pre requisite for the feasibility of risk based regulationwhich will be discussed in the final section of this article.
77
Enforced Self Regulation envisions that in particular situations, it will be more efficacious for the regulated firms to take on some or all of the legislative, executive and judicial regulatory functions. 78 Ayres and Braithwaite however stress that whatever particular regulatory functions should be "sub contracted" to the regulated firms would be dependent on the industry's structure and historical performance and that delegation of legislative functions need not imply delegation of executive functions. The issue of monitoring is crucial in the model of Enforced Self-Regulation. In achieving the right mix of regulatory strategies, the right reallocation of regulatory resources would be important. 79 Direct government monitoring would still be necessary for firms too small too afford their own compliance groups. 80 State involvement would not stop at monitoring as violations of the privately written and publicly ratified rules would be punishable by law .
